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PARTIES

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant;
vs.
WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE; CONMART, INC., a Utah
corporation; SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the
State of Utah; KATIE L. DIXON, an individual and in her capacity
as former Salt Lake County Recorder; and JOHN DOES I through III;
Defendants and Appellees.

WILLIAM S. LOVE and IRENE C. LOVE,
Counterclaimants and Third Party Plaintiffs;
vs.
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., a Utah Corporation; UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM J. LOWENBERG,
WESTERN MANAGEMENT, a partnership; SMITH, HALANDER & SMITH, a
partnership; MINSON-HALANDER, Inc., a Utah corporation; H. FRED
SMITH; RONALD W. SMITH; DALE N. MINSON; ROBERT S. HALANDER;
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
corporation; MARILYN M. HENRIKSEN, solely in her capacity as
trustee; and JOHN DOES 1 - 1 0 ;
Counterclaim and Third Party Defendants.
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IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
This case is before the Court upon appellant's appeal of an

Order of the Third Judicial District Court, Stephen L. Henriod,
J., granting the motion of Salt Lake County and Katie Dixon to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Upon

consideration of said motion, the District Court considered
matters outside the pleadings, i..e. , affidavit of William
Meaders, with exhibits; deposition of Marlene Peterson; affidavit
of Marlene Peterson; and affidavit of Debra DeRose, with
exhibits.

In granting County's and Dixon's motion to dismiss,

the trial court thus treated the motion as one for summary
judgment and disposed of it as provided in Rule 56, Utah Rules of

3

Civil Procedure.

Jurisdiction to hear the appeal of Appellant of

the Order of Dismissal entered by the court below is established
by § 78-2-2(3)(k)# U.C.A., 1953 as amended.
V

STATEMENT OF ISSUE(S) PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented upon appeal concerning appellees County

and Dixon is simply whether appellant presented its claim against
appellees within the limitation period of one year as required by
§63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.
As a decision granting a motion for summary judgment, the
standard of review to be applied by this Court is to review the
trial court's decision for correctness. [Warren vs. Provo City
Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (UT 1992)].
VI

STATUTES, INTERPRETATION OF WHICH IS DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
OR WHICH ARE OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE - SET OUT VERBATIM WITH
APPROPRIATE CITATION.
A.

§63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

§63-30-11 Claim for injury - Notice - Contents - Service - Legal
disability.

(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity
before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
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B.

§63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended

§63-30-13 Claim against political subdivision or its employee Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year
after the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension
of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
(In 1991 and 1993, the foregoing statutes differed slightly
in nouns, pronouns, etc., but were identical in their substantive
requirements.)
VII

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellees County and Dixon accept appellant's statement of

the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its
disposition in the trial court.

For the purposes only of the

issue before this Court concerning appellees County and Dixon,
said appellees also accept appellant's statement of facts and
stipulate that there no issues of fact relative to that issue.
VIII SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's cause of action
against County and Dixon should be upheld for the reasons set
forth hereafter.
February, 1991.

Plaintiff's cause of action arose in January or
Plaintiff admits as such.
5

[Appellants brief, p.

47; Amnded Complnt, 1 42, (R. 789.)]

Plaintiff submitted its

claim upon that cause of action, under the procedures required by
§ 63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, on August 4, 1997. [R. 946950.]

To toll the limitation period established in §63-30-13 for

five and one-half years, plaintiff must fit itself within the
criteria established by this court in Warren vs. Provo City
Corporation, 838 P.2d 1125 (UT 1992).

Those criteria are: (1)

situations where the rule calling for tolling the period for
limitation of actions until discovery of the cause of action is
mandated by statute (e.g., §78-12-19, U.C.A.),

(2) situations

where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct, and
(3) situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances
and application of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has
prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
at 1129.)

(Warren,

supra,

Of those criteria, the only one applicable is the

third stated above, i.e., existence of exceptional circumstances
making application of the general rule irrational or unjust.
There is no specific statute mandating tolling in this case, and,
since the second criterion calls for evidence of intentional,
misleading conduct, there is no evidence to bring it into
consideration.

Thus, defendants County and Dixon's contention
6

that the statute of limitations has run must be measured by the
facts peculiar to this case to determine whether exceptional
circumstances exist to excuse plaintiff's failure to file its
claim as required by §63-30-13, U.C.A..

As will be pointed out

hereafter, it is obvious from plaintiff's own exhibits and
admissions in its brief before this Court that there are no
exceptional circumstances which would justify a tolling of the
limitation period until August 4, 1996, which is one year before
plaintiff submitted its notice of claim to Salt Lake County's
governing body.

Thus, since plaintiff either knew, or should

have known, of the existence of its alleged cause of action prior
to August 4, 1996, plaintiff unjustifiably submitted its notice
of claim beyond the one-year limitation period allowed by §63-3013.

As a consequence, its claim is barred.

IX

ARGUMENT
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST APPELLEES SALT LAKE COUNTY AND KATIE
L. DIXON WAS PROPERLY ENTERED UPON BASIS OF PLAINTIFF'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH NOTICE OF CLAIM REQUIREMENTS OF
THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT

The issue on appeal involving Salt Lake County and Katie L.
Dixon is a narrow one.

Simply stated, County and Dixon assert

the affirmative defense that plaintiff failed to submit its claim
against County and Dixon within the limitation period of one year
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established by §63-30-13, U.C.A., 1953 as amended.

This

limitation period, even though set forth as part of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act, and not within the general chapter
concerning limitation of actions (Title 78, Chapter 12, U.C.A.),
is considered and applied by this Court in the same manner as a
statue of limitations.

Warren, supra,

at 1128.

At the time of the negligence alleged by plaintiff in its
complaint,

Katie Dixon was the selected Recorder for Salt Lake

County, and was, at all times pertinent to plaintiff's complaint,
acting within the scope of her duties as an officer of Salt Lake
County. [Amnded Complnt 1j 44, R. 790.]

Thus, by virtue of §63-

30-11, U.C.A., the one year limitation period of §63-30-13(2),
U.C.A., applies also to plaintiff's complaint against Ms. Dixon.
Any cause of action against County and Dixon accrued "upon
the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause
of action. . .(and) mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of
action (did) not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations."

(Warren, supra,

at 1128-1129).

Thus, the statute

of limitations upon plaintiff's cause of action against County
and Dixon began to run, according to plaintiff's own admission
(Appellant's Brief, p. 47), no later than January or February,
1991.

That was six years and six months before August 4, 1997 -

the date plaintiff presented its claim against County and Dixon
8

to County's governing body.

Unless excused, plaintiff was five

years and six months too late.
Plaintiff claims it should be excused from the lateness of
its notice of claim under the doctrine established by this Court
in Warren, supra,

as well as in other cases involving statutes of

limitation, rKlinaer vs. Kiahtlv, 791 P.2d 868 (UT 1990), Myers
vs. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (UT 1981)], which hold that limitation
periods may be tolled where exceptional circumstances would make
the application of the limitation period irrational or unjust.
However, even in such "exceptional" circumstances, the tolling
would end, and the period of limitations would begin, when the
plaintiff "knew or should have known" of the existence of its
cause of action against County and Dixon.
Klinger, supra,

Meyers,

(Warren,

supra;

supra).

The trial court found that plaintiff "knew or should have
known" that it had a cause of action against County and Dixon
prior to August 4, 1996 (R. 1313) and granted County's and
Dixon's motion to dismiss.

Plaintiff now asserts before this

Court that it should it be excused from the "know or should have
known" standard at any time prior to August 4, 1996.

Not only

that, says plaintiff, but it did not, in fact, actually know of
County's and Dixon's alleged negligence for nearly another year,
i.e., July 2, 1997! !
9

Since the question whether the "know or should hatve known''
standard applies in a particular case is one of law and not of
fact (Klinger, supra,

at 869) this Court may now weigh

plaintiff's current claim of innocent bewilderment at the wrong
allegedly done by the County Recorder in light of all the
circumstances of this case.

As a question of law, this Court

makes no deference to the findings of the trial court..

However,

an examination of the circumstances will surely lead this Court
to the same conclusion as that of the court below.
This Court stated in Warren,, supra,

at 1129:

The ultimate determination of whether a case presents
exceptional circumstances that render the application
of a statute of limitations irrational or unjust turns
on a balancing test. However, before a court reaches
this test, an initial showing must be made that the
plaintiff did not know of and could not reasonably have
known of the existence of the cause of action in time
to file a claim within the limitation period.
Let us examine the plaintiff's explanation for its failure
to discover its cause of action for more than six and one-half
years after it arose.

We may recall that plaintiff admits that

its cause of action arose in January or February, 1991, because,
according to plaintiff, that would have been the time the County
Recorder's office negligently omitted to properly record the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed as required by Utah's recording statute.
(1|42, Amnded Cmplnt, R. 789.)

For the purposes of this appeal,

10

County and Dixon accept

plaintiff's claim that it did not

initially have actual knowledge of the Corrective Warranty Deed
which was recorded on January 23, 1991. (Aff. Mark Snyder, R.
268.)

Plaintiff admits, however, that on or about April 12,

1996, it was aware that Loves claimed an easement over its
property.

(Appellants' brief, p. 48). And, as evidenced by

letter dated May 23, 1996, (Appellant's Addendum., Ex. 1 of Ex.
6) and admitted by plaintiff in its brief (Appellant's brief, p.
48), plaintiff's attorney had completed an initial evaluation of

I
the claimed easement and of the efficacy of the corrective
warranty deed which purported to create the easement ("Fact 8",
p.2, plntf's memo in opp to mot to dismiss, R. 1073) by May 23,
1996. (emphasis added.)

Considering the first of those

admissions, and giving plaintiff the benefit of a week or two to
return to the Recorder's office to examine the source of Loves'
claim of easement, plaintiff should have known of the alleged
negligence in recording the Corrective Warranty Deed by at least
April 26, 1996.

Considering the second of those admissions,

plaintiff must have had actual knowledge of the alleged
negligence no later than May 23, 1996, since plaintiff's attorney
had, by that time examined the efficacy of the Corrective
Warranty Deed.
It is also instructive to note that immediately after April
11

12, 1996, plaintiff tendered its defense against Loves' claim of
easement to its title insurance company.
48.)

(Appellant's Brief, p.

The defense wasn't tendered to just anyone.

It was

tendered to a professional title insurance company - a company
with vast experience and expertise in the examination of chains
of title and the manner and means of recording documents, and
which has staked great sums of money in reliance upon that
experience and expertise.
Plaintiff now seems to want us to consider these
professionals as rubes who, upon receipt of the tender of defense
against Loves' claim of easement, took a look at the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed and said,
know?

"Well, well. What do you

From the looks of this deed, which, by the way, has a

bunch of recording information stamped on it, such as it being
document 5,015,202 with a recording date of January 23, 1991 and
recorded in book 6284, at page 1366 of Salt Lake County's
recorded documents of title, the Loves appear to have an easement
over the property we have insured as being free of such
encumbrances.
screwed up.

I guess we just missed this thing.

Obviously, we

Well, there's no sense in going back into the

records now to find out why or how we made such a colossal
mistake."
On the contrary, the moment plaintiff, especially its title
12

insurance company, heard of, or saw a copy of that 1991
corrective warranty deed, they must have, and at the very least,
should have, been on notice that something was awry, either in
the recording of that document or in their research.

Their claim

of ignorance of a potential cause of action against the office of
the Salt Lake County Recorder, past May 23, 1996, flies in the
face of the facts and of common sense.

Being aware of a

potential cause of action, plaintiff was not entitled to sit back
and ignore the matter, especially in light of the Utah law
requiring claims against governmental entities to be filed within
one year of the date they arise.

In this case, if an error in

recording had occurred, it would be obvious that it would have to
have occurred at some point between the date the document was
accepted for recording and date stamped (January 23, 1991), and
July, 1993, the date the title insurance examiners would have
researched the chain of title on plaintiff's behalf when
plaintiff purchased its parcel from Conmart.

Plaintiff and

plaintiff's experts in title examination were under a duty to act
with all due diligence to formulate their claim, if any they had,
against Salt Lake County for negligence in the recording
procedures applicable to the 1991 Corrective Warranty Deed.
Plaintiffs' admit as much in their brief to this Court by
stating, at page 34, U A person on inquiry notice who does not
13

make inquiry is deemed to have constructive notice and is not a
purchaser in good faith" - citing Burlington Northern, Inc., vs.
L.P. Hall, 322 N.W.2d 233 (N.D. 1982).

The duty to inquire arose

as soon as plaintiff and its agents became aware of Love's claim
of easement.

They were obligated to act with dispatch - not at

their leisure.
This is the heart of County's and Dixon's motion to dismiss
plaintiff's alleged cause of action against them.

This is a case

involving large sums of money, with a corporate plaintiff,
professional title examiners, title insurance companies, and real
estate attorneys.

The delay of those agents in pursuing the

obvious possibility of error in the recording of the 1991
Corrective Warranty Deed cannot be excused.

This high-powered

legal talent and expertise (see qualifications as recited in
Affidavit of Arlen Taylor, 1)1's 1-11, R. 391-193, 395) simply
dropped the ball.

They cannot now be indulged in the claim that

their delay in actually discovering the alleged negligence,
especially immediately after April 12, 1996 and no later than May
23, 1996, is excusable.

Their position is especially ludicrous

in light of plaintiff's claim that they did not actually learn of
the County's alleged negligence until July 2, 1997 - after
approximately 18 months of discussions, legal wranglings, and
negotiations between plaintiff and plaintiff's attorneys and the
14

Loves and their attorneys.
Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in
"penalizing" Arnold for settlement efforts.

The limitation

period in the notice requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act
is a statute of limitations.

(Warren, supra)

.

Every lawsuit

involves consideration of such matters as settlement.

Statutes

of limitations have never been tolled to allow the parties time
to negotiate settlement until those efforts fail before filing
their lawsuit.

Plaintiff further contends that it had no reason

to suspect negligence on the part of the County because the
negligence hid itself.
straight face?

How can such an assertion be made with a

Starting with a document stamped with a document

number, a book and page notation, and a recording date, how can
professional title examiners avoid the question which fairly
screams out for an answer, "Why didn't we find this deed?"

What

stymied an effort on their part to find whether that document was
properly recorded?
tract index?

What else is needed to examine, e.g., the

Plaintiff's answer to these questions, before the

trial court and in its brief to this Court, is specious.
Finally plaintiff claims in pp. 50-51 of its brief that it
is unreasonable to expect them to learn of County's and Dixon's
alleged negligence in only 114 days between April 12, 1996 and
August 4, 1996.

Plaintiffs had the advantage of a copy of the
15

actual document in question, with recording information stamped
upon it, to begin its search.

All the search required was to

find out details concerning one document - not an entire chain of
title.

Such a search would require less than an afternoon.

Surely it is incredible to assert a need for more than one to two
weeks, much less 114 days, to accomplish such a simple task.
X

CONCLUSION STATING PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
In conclusion, County and Dixon pray for an Order of this

Court affirming the Order and Judgment of the Third District
Court which dismissed plaintiff's cause of action against them.
XI
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Respectfully submitted this /i-^day of
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,

2001.

KEVAN F. SMITH
Deputy District Attorney for Salt
Lake County
Attorney for Appellees Salt Lake
County and Katie L. Dixon
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ADDENDUM

1.

Warren vs. Provo City Corporation

WARREN v. PROVO CITY CORP.

Utah H25

Cites*638 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992)

Returning to the present case, Arguello to Weathershield, not from any deliberate
contends that personal jurisdiction is appro- action by defendant
priate because Industrial placed the maWe conclude that neither the "arising out
chine in the stream of commerce by its sale of theory nor the "stream of commerce"
to Pickering in California and that it was theory will support a finding of the miniforeseeable that the machine would be re- mum contacts necessary for assertion of
sold in Utah. Industrial responds that the jurisdiction over Industrial for the purmachine never entered the stream of composes of Arguello's claims. Because jurismerce because it was sold to an ultimate
diction cannot be asserted in accordance
buyer and resale of the machine in Utah
was wholly unforeseeable. We agree with with the due process clause, the district
Industrial. The facts are analogous to court's decision is affirmed.
those in World-Wide Volkswagen. There,
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate C.J., and
the Court found that the New York defendants could not have anticipated being ha- STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
led into court in Oklahoma because they
sold no cars in Oklahoma, they did not
( O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >
serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma market, they did not advertise in Oklahoma,
and they had no salespersons in Oklahoma.
444 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct at 566. Here,
Industrial could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Utah because it sold no finger jointing machines in
Charles R. WARREN, Plaintiff
Utah and it did not seek to serve the Utah
and Appellant,
market for finger jointing machines
through either sales representatives or advertising. In addition, Utah accounts for PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a munic0.3 percent of Industrial's total sales, and
ipal corporation; James R. Mathis, airthese are almost exclusively sales of parts
port manager for Provo City Corporawhich are initiated by requests from Utah
tion Airport; and John Does 1-10, Debusinesses. It was wholly unforeseeable
fendants and Appellees.
that Industrial would be subject to a suit in
No. 910217.
Utah involving a finger jointing machine.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Other facts make this case even weaker
than World-Wide Volkswagen for the exSept. 23, 1992.
ercise of personal jurisdiction. In that
case, a car was the subject of the suit, and
it was at least foreseeable that a car sold in
Pilot injured in crash of airplane which
New York might, at some point, be driven he had leased from flying club brought
in Oklahoma. In the present case, howev- action against city for city's alleged failure
er, the subject of the suit is a large, immoto enforce ordinance regulating flying
bile jointing machine. Moreover, the conclubs. The Fourth District Court, Utah
clusion that it was sold to an ultimate buyCounty, Ray M. Harding, J., granted sumer is evidenced by the fact that Pickering,
mary judgment for city, and pilot appealed.
the initial purchaser, requested specialized
The
Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that:
modifications to the machine before deliv(1)
exceptional
circumstances exception to
ery and paid sales tax, which strongly sugapplication
of
statute
of limitations did not
gests that resale was not planned. Indusapply
to
pilot's
action,
and (2) concealment
trial never attempted to enter the machine
version
of
discovery
rule
did not apply to
into a stream of commerce that ran to
pilot's
action.
Utah. The machine arrived in Utah due
only to the unforeseeable sale by Pickering
Affirmed.
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Utah

838 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

1. Judgment <s=>183
When affidavits or other evidence is
presented in conjunction with motion to
dismiss, motion is treated as motion for
summary judgment Rules Civ.Proc, Rules
12(b)(6), 56(c).
2. Appeal and Error <s»934(l)
In appeal from summary judgment,
Supreme Court views facts in light most
favorable to party opposing motion.
3. Judgment <3=>181(1), 185(2)
Summary judgment is appropriate if,
viewing evidence in light most favorable to
nonmoving party, moving party is nevertheless entitled to judgment as matter of
law. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
4. Appeal and Error e»863
Supreme Court reviews trial court's decision granting motion for summary judgment for correctness.
5. Municipal Corporations <s»741.1(5)
Notice of claim provisions in Governmental Immunity Act operate as one-year
statute of limitations in cases brought
against governmental entity. U.C.A.1953,
63-30-11, 63-30-13.
6. Limitation of Actions *»95(1)
Cause of action accrues and relevant
statute of limitations begins to run upon
happening of last event necessary to complete cause of action and mere ignorance of
existence of cause of action does not prevent running of statute of limitations; however, in certain instances, discovery rule
allows for tolling of statute of limitations
until discovery of facts forming basis for
cause of action.
7. Limitation of Actions e»95(l), 104(1)
Discovery rule applies in situations
where it is mandated by statute, in situations where plaintiff does not become
aware of cause of action because of defendant's concealment or misleading conduct,
and in situations where case presents exceptional circumstances and application of
general rule would be irrational or unjust,
regardless of any showing that defendant
-has prevented discovery of cause of action.

8. Limitation of Actions <s=>43
Ultimate determination of whether
case presents exceptional circumstances
that render application of statute of limitations irrational or unjust turns on balancing test; court will balance hardship imposed on plaintiff against any prejudice to
defendant resulting from difficulties of
proof caused by passage of time.
9. Limitation of Actions e ^ a d )
Before court reaches balancing test
with respect to exceptional circumstances
exception to statute of limitations, initial
showing must be made that plaintiff did
not know of and could not reasonably have
known of existence of cause of action in
time to file claim within limitation period.
10. Limitation of Actions 3=>95(3)
Pilot who was injured in airplane crash
did not show that he could not have reasonably known about cause of action against
city for its alleged failure to enforce ordinance regulating flying clubs in time to file
claim within statute of limitations, so that
exceptional circumstances exception to
statute of limitations did not apply; fact
that airplane crashed gave pilot reasonable
grounds to question whether city was enforcing ordinance, fact that pilot's counsel
requested information from city airport
concerning flying club's insurance ten
months after crash indicated that pilot
knew of requirements of ordinance well
within one-year period for filing notice of
claim against city, and pilot made no further investigation beyond making unspecified number of telephone calls to airport
within statutory period. U.C.A.1953, 6330-11, 63-30-13.
11. Limitation of Actions $=>104U)
"Concealment; version of discovery
rule" is essentially claim of equitable estoppel whereby defendant who causes delay in
bringing of cause of action is estopped
from relying on statute of limitations as
defense to action..
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
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12. Estoppel e»59
For equitable estoppel doctrine to be
invoked, showing must be made that, under
circumstances, party claiming estoppel has
acted in reasonable manner.
13. Limitation of Actions <3=>104(1)
In order to invoke concealment version
of discovery rule, it must be shown that,
given defendant's actions, reasonable plaintiff would not have brought suit within
statutory period.
14. Limitation of Actions $=»165
While party may be excused for failing
to pursue claim if party acted in reasonable
reliance on defendant's representations, absent any representations by defendant,
plaintiff must take reasonable steps to
prosecute claim.
15. Limitation of Actions ®»104(2)
Pilot injured in airplane crash who
brought action against city alleging that
city failed to enforce ordinances regulating
flying clubs did not rely on representations
made by city, so that concealment version
of discovery rule was not applicable to toll
statute of limitations on pilot's action; pilot
did not take reasonable steps to investigate
city's liability, notwithstanding his contention that city did not return his telephone
calls in deliberate attempt to prevent him
from discovering existence of cause of action within statutory period.
Wayne B. Watson, Thomas J. Scribner,
Provo, for plaintiff and appellant.
David C. Dixon, Gary L. Gregerson, Robert D. West, Provo, for defendants and
appellees.
1. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 6^-30-11 to -15.

HALL, Chief Justice:
Charles R. Warren appeals from an order
of the fourth district court dismissing his
complaint. The complaint alleged that Provo City Corporation and James R. Mathis
("Provo") are liable for injuries Warren
sustained in the crash of an airplane leased
from Western Flyers Flying Club, an organization regulated by Provo. The trial
court ruled that Warren's failure to file a
notice of claim within one year from the
date the claim arose, as required by sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, bars his claim.1
We affirm.
[1,2] The court dismissed the complaint
pursuant to Provo's motion for summary
judgment2 In an appeal from a summary
judgment, we view the facts in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.3
In September of 1988, Warren leased an
airplane from Western Flyers, a flying club
with its base of operations located at Provo
City Airport. Provo ordinance 13.03.060
regulates flying' clubs. Specifically, the ordinance requires flying clubs to assure that
their airplanes are airworthy and in compliance with appropriate federal regulations.
The ordinance also requires flying clubs to
maintain adequate insurance and file a certificate of insurance at Provo City Airport.
On September 10, 1988, the airplane that
Warren leased from Western Flyers
crashed, injuring Warren, his wife, and
their son. Shortly thereafter, Warren obtained counsel to assist him in seeking recovery for damages sustained in the crash.
is presented in conjunction with a 12(b)(6) motion, the motion is generally treated as a motion
for summary judgment, pursuant to rule 56(c)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah
R.Civ.P. 12(c); Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc.,
818 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1991). Given the
court's ruling and the fact that both parties
submitted affidavits, we will treat the motion in
the instant case as a motion for summary judgment

2. Provo's motion to dismiss did not cite any
specific rule of civil procedure. However, both
of the memorandums in support of and in opposition to the motion to dismiss were accompanied by affidavits, and the trial court ruled that
the complaint should be dismissed, even if Warren's factual assertions are presumed correct.
We have previously treated motions to dismiss
on the ground that the plaintiff did not timely
file a notice of claim as motions pursuant to
rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce- 3. Culp Constr. Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d
dure. See Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 628 650, 651 (Utah 1990).
(Utah 1983). When affidavits or other evidence
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During the months of June, July, August, and September of 1989, Warren's
counsel telephoned Provo City Airport manager James R. Mathis, requesting information concerning Western Flyers' insurance.
However, Warren never reached Mathis,
and the calls were not returned.
On September 12,1989, one year and two
days after the crash, Warren's counsel sent
a letter to Mathis, requesting information
concerning Western Flyers' insurance. On
December 5, 1989, counsel for Provo wrote
to Warren's counsel, advising him that Provo City Airport did not have Western
Flyers' certificate of insurance on file and
Western Flyers had not responded to inquiries concerning whether they had maintained the required insurance. On March
26, 1990, over one year and six months
after the crash, Warren filed a notice of
claim asserting that Provo is liable for his
personal injuries because Provo failed to
enforce ordinance 13.03.060.
Provo denied the claim. Thereafter,
Warren filed a complaint alleging that Provo is liable for his personal injuries because
of its failure to enforce ordinance 13.03.060
and assure that Western Flyers' airplanes
were airworthy and adequately insured.
Provo moved to dismiss on the ground
that Warren had failed to file a timely
notice of claim. Warren, through new
counsel, argued in his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, that the
discovery rule should apply to excuse his
failure to file a notice of claim because he
did not have reasonable grounds to believe

that Provo was not enforcing its ordinances
until more than a year after the crash.
Warren further alleged that Provo concealed the fact that Western Flyers did not
have adequate insurance on file in a deliberate attempt to prevent him from obtaining incriminating information within the
statutory period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint,
ruling that "plaintiffs own negligence prohibited him from filing a timely notice of
claim; however, even assuming that defendants intentionally concealed [Provo's failure to require Western Flyers to file a
certificate of insurance], such concealment
did not prevent plaintiff from filing an adequate notice of claim within the statutory
period."
[3,4] A single issue is properly before
this court: Did the trial court err in granting Provo's motion for summary judgment
on the basis that the discovery rule does
not apply and therefore sections 63-30-11
and 63-30-13 bar Warren's claim? 4 Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, the moving party is
nevertheless entitled! to a judgment as a
matter of law.5 Accordingly, we review
the trial court's decision granting a motion
for summary judgment for correctness.6
[5,6] The notice of claim provisions of
sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-13 operate as
a one-year statute of limitations in cases
brought against a governmental entity.7
Generally, a cause of action accrues and
the relevant statute of limitations begins to

4. On appeal, Warren also asserls that sections
63-30-11 and 63-30-13 violate various provisions of the state and federal constitutions. In
making this contention, he asks us to overrule
our decisions in Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d
245, 249 (Utah 1988), and Sears v. Southworth,
563 P.2d 192, 193 (Utah 1977), which uphold the
constitutionality of the challenged sections.
However, Warren did not raise these arguments
with the trial court. With limited exceptions,
our practice has been to decline consideration
of issues raised for the first time on appeal.
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Ba\ of Educ., 191 P.2d
412, 413 (Utah 1990); Pratt v. City Council of
City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah
1981). Therefore, we do not address these
claims.

5. Utah R.CW.P. 56(c); see also Transamerica
Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power <fr Water, Inc.,
789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 1990); Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) (per curiam).
6. Transamerica, 789 P.2d at 25; Bonham, 788
P.2d at 499.
7. See, e.g„ O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs.,
821 P.2d 1139, 1141 (Utah 1991) (applying general law dealing with statute of limitations to
notices of claims). Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-3011 to -15 provide that in order to bring a claim
against a governmental entity, a plaintiff must
file a notice of claim within one year of the time
the action arose. If the claim is denied, the
plaintiff has one year from the denial of the
claim to file a complaint.
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run "upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action
... [and] mere ignorance of the existence
of a cause of action does not prevent the
running of the statute of limitations."8
However, in certain instances, the discovery rule allows for the tolling of a statute
of limitations "until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action." *
[7] This court has recognized three circumstances where the discovery rule applies: (1) in situations where the discovery
rule is mandated by statute;10 (2) in situations where a plaintiff does not become
aware of the cause of action because of the
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; n and (3) in situations where the case
presents exceptional circumstances and the
application of the general rule would be
irrational or unjust, regardless of any
showing that the defendant has prevented
the discovery of the cause of action.12
Warren contends that both the exceptionalcircumstances and the concealment versions of the discovery rule apply to excuse
his failure to file a timely notice of claim.

The fact that the plane crashed gave
Warren reasonable grounds to question
whether Provo was enforcing ordinance
13.03.060 and requiring Western Flyers to
keep its airplanes in airworthy condition.
Furthermore, the fact that Warren's counsel phoned Provo City Airport in June of
1989 indicates that Warren knew of the
requirements of ordinance 13.03.060 well
within the one-year period. However,
though Warren knew of the ordinance and
should have been on notice that the ordinance may not have been enforced, the
only inquiry he undertook into Provo's liability was to make an unspecified number
of phone calls to Provo City Airport Despite his failure to reach the airport manager, he made no further investigation within
the statutory period.
Clearly, Warren has not alleged any
facts demonstrating that he undertook reasonable steps to investigate Provo's liability. Therefore, as a matter of law, Warren
has not shown that he could not have reasonably known about the cause of action in
time to file his claim within the statutory
period. Accordingly, the trial court was
correct in dismissing this claim on summary judgment

[8-10] We turn first to Warren's exceptional-circumstances argument. The ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances that render
the application of a statute of limitations
irrational or unjust turns on a balancing
test13 However, before a court reaches
this test, an initial showing must be made
that the plaintiff did not know of and could
not reasonably have known of the existence
of the cause of action in time to file a claim
within the limitation period.14 A review of
the record reveals that Warren has not
made this threshold showing.

Warren's remaining contention is that
the concealment version of the discovery
rule applies to excuse his failure to file a
timely notice of claim. Warren bases this
argument on the contention that Provo did
not return his phone calls in a deliberate
attempt to prevent him from discovering
the existence of a cause of action within
the statutory period.

8. Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah
1981); see also O'Neal 821 P.2d at 1143.

12. Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872; Myers, 635 P.2d at
87.

[11-13] The concealment version of the
discovery rule is essentially a claim of equi-

9. Myers, 635 P.2d at 86; see also O'Neal 821
?2& at 1143; Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868,
869 (Utah 1990).

13. A court will balance the hardship imposed on
the plaintiff against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from "difficulties of proof caused
by the passage of time.'* Myers, 635 P2d at 87;
10. Eg., Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-19; Utah Code
see also Klinger, 791 P.2d at 872.
Ann. § 78-12-26; see also Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.

11. Eg., Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d
105, 107 (Utah 1978); Rice v. Granite School
Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22. 456 P.2d 159, 163 (1969);
see also Myers, 635 P.2d at 86.

14. O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144; see also Atwood v.
Sturm, Ruger 6 Co., 823 ?2d 1064, 1065 (Utah
1992); Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr.
Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1987).
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table estoppel, whereby a defendant who
causes a delay in the bringing of a cause of
action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as a defense to the action.15 As is true in all cases of equitable
estoppel, for the doctrine to be invoked a
showing must be made that, under the
circumstances, the party claiming estoppel
has acted in a reasonable manner.16 Therefore, in order to invoke the concealment
version of the discovery rule it must be
shown that given the defendant's actions, a
reasonable plaintiff would not have
brought suit within the statutory period.17
Accordingly, we have held that summary
judgment is inappropriate despite the failure to file a timely notice of claim or complaint when a plaintiff alleged that an
agent for the state assured her that she
would be fully compensated as soon as her
medical costs were ascertained;18 when a
plaintiff alleged that an agent for the state
erroneously told him that a runoff culvert
could not possibly have caused the water
damage on his property;1* and when a
plaintiff alleged that an agent for the state
erroneously told her that the person driving an automobile that collided with her
was not an employee of the state.20
However, we have upheld summary judgments because of a failure to file a timely
notice of claim or complaint when a plaintiff who was aware of the statute and
represented by counsel alleged only that
the defendant lulled him into "a false sense
15. Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah
1989); Rice, 456 P.2d at 161-64.

of security [regarding the possibility of a
settlement] by requesting medical information about [his] physical condition"21 and
when a plaintiff alleged that an agent for
the state gave him erroneous information
regarding the governmental entity responsible for a strip of highway at issue but the
court concluded that the failure to file a
notice of claim was caused by the plaintiffs own "inadvertence."22
[14,15] In the instant case, Warren
does not allege that he relied on any representation made by Provo. Ratiier, he
claims that he was prevented from discovering the cause of action because F*rovo did
not return his phone calls. However, as
discussed above, Warren did not take reasonable steps to investigate Provo's liability. While a party may be excused for
failing to pursue a claim if the party acted
in reasonable reliance on a defendant's representations, absent any representations by
the defendant, a plaintiff must take reasonable steps to prosecute the claim. Otherwise, there can be no showing ithat the
defendant's actions prevented the discovery
of the cause of action.
Because Warren has not alleged any
facts that demonstrate that he took reasonable steps to pursue his claim or that he
reasonably relied on a representation made
by Provo, the concealment version of the
discovery rule is not applicable to the instant case. Therefore, the trial court was
488 (1972); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Plaintiff's Diligence as Affecting His Right to have
Defendant Estopped From Pleading the Statute
of Limitations, 44 AXJUd 760, 768 (1972).

16. See CECO v. Concrete Specialists Inc., 772
P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989), wherein we stated
that estoppel requires proof of "reasonable ac- 17. See generally 43 AX.R.3d at 443; 44 A.L.R.3d
tion or inaction by the other party taken or not
at 488; 44 A.L.R.3d at 768 and cases cited theretaken on the basis of the first party's statement,
in.
admission, act, or failure to act." Id. (emphasis
added). See also Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d
1151, 1155 (Utah 1981), wherein we stated, MA 18. Rice, 456 P.2d at 161-64.
party claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or acts ... if he had the means by 19. Vincent, 583 ?2d at 106-07.
which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the true situation." Id (emphasis added). 20. Forsman, 779 ?2d at 220.
See also Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Fraud,
Misrepresentation, or Deception as Estopping Re-21. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 925, 926 (Utah
1977).
liance on Statute of Limitations, 43 A.L.R.3d
429, 443 (1972); Allan E. Korpela, Annotation,
Promise to Settle or Perform as Estopping Reli- 22. Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah
ance on Statute of Limitations, 44 A.L.R.3d 482,
1973).
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also correct in granting summary judgment
on that ground.
Affirmed.
HOWE, Associate CJ., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

Dana GRAMLICH, Plaintiff
and Appellant,

Jay P. MUNSEY, M.D., Richard Home,
D.C., and Moab Family Chiropractic
Clinic, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 900466.

1. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»17.5
Medical malpractice action was not
barred due to plaintiffs failure to file request for prelitigation review within 60
days of original notice of intent to commence action, where original notice of intent to commence action was served within
90 days of expiration of statute of limitations thereby entitling plaintiff to additional 120-day extension, and plaintiff filed
second notice of intent within newly enlarged limitations period followed promptly
by second request for prelitigatdon review.
U.C.A.1953, 78-14-2, 78-14-4(1), 78-14-8,
78-14-12, 78-14-12(l)(c), (2, 3).
2. Physicians and Surgeons <s=»17.5
Medical malpractice plaintiffs failure
to file her request for prelitigation review
within 60 days of original notice of intent
to commence action did not render original
notice invalid so as to preclude plaintiff
from extending the limitations period by
120 days. U.C.A.1953, 78-14-2, 78-14-4(1),
78-14-8, 78-14-12, 78-14-12(l)(c), (2, 3).

Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 23, 1992.

In medical malpractice action, the Seventh District Court, Grand County, Boyd
Bunnell, J., dismissed complaint on defendant's motion for summary judgment
based upon plaintiffs failure to meet 60day deadline for filing request for prelitigation panel review after serving notice of
intent to commence action on defendant.
Plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court,
Durham, J., held that plaintiffs failure to
file request for prelitigation review within
60 days of original notice of intent to commence action did not bar action since original notice was served within 90 days of
expiration of statute of limitations entitling
plaintiff to additional 120 days to file her
action and plaintiff filed second notice and
promptly made second request for prelitigation review within newly enlarged limitations period.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., dissented.

Don R. Petersen, Leslie W. Slaugh, Provo, for Gramlich.
Elliott J. Williams, David W. Slagle, Elizabeth King, Salt Lake City, for Munsey.
DURHAM, Justice:
Plaintiff Dana Gramlich appeals from a
summary judgment dismissing her malpractice action for failure to comply in a
timely manner with the prelitigation review
requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("the Act"). Because we do
not find that a failure to initiate prelitigation review within 60 days of serving a
notice of intent to commence an action
("notice") is a jurisdictional bar, we reverse.
In reviewing motions for summary judgment, we view the facts in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. D & L
Supply v. Saurini 775 P.2d 420, 421 (Utah
1989). We state the facts accordingly.
In March and October of 1985, Ms.
Gramlich consulted defendant Dr. Jay P.
Munsey, complaining of a numbness on the

ADDENDUM
2.
Klinger vs. Kightlv

868

Utah

791 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Robert B. KLINGER and Karol J.
Klinger, Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
Eugene E. RIGHTLY, Helen L. Rightly,
Harry D. Rreis, Peggy R. Kreis Barnett,
United Farm Agency, Inc., and Gerald
W. Wilkerson, Defendants and Appellants.
Eugene E. RIGHTLY, Helen L. Rightly,
Harry D. Rreis, Peggy R. Rreis
Barnett, Third-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
Glen H. CALDER and John Doe Wilson,
individually and dba Wilson & Calder,
Third-Party Defendants and Appellees.
No. 880003.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 22, 1990.
After they were sued for rescission
based on mutual mistake, property vendors
asserted third-party claim against surveyor
for negligence. The Seventh District
Court, Salt Lake County, Dennis L. Draney, J., dismissed third-party complaint,
and vendors appealed. The Supreme
Court, Hall, CJ., held that "discovery rule"
applied to surveyor negligence statute of
limitations.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, Associate C.J., concurred and
filed opinion.
Stewart, J., concurred in result.
1. Judgment <3=»181(2, S)
Summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Limitation of Actions <§=>95(1)
Under "discovery rule," cause of action does not accrue and statute of limitations does not begin to run until plaintiff
learns of, or, in exercise of reasonable diligence, should have learned of, facts which
give rise to cause of action; rule functions

as exception to normal application of statute of limitations.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3 Limitation of Actions <3=>199(1)
Whether discovery rule applies to
cause of action and its statute of limitations is question of law and not of fact.
4. Judgment <s=»181(2)
Questions of law may be disposed of
through summary judgment if there are no
outstanding questions of material fact to
be discerned by the trier of fact. Rules
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c).
5. Limitation of Actions ®=>96(2), 100(1)
Statute under which limitations period
governing actions for relief on grounds of
fraud or mistake does not accrue until discovery of facts constituting fraud or mistake did not apply to property vendors'
negligence cause of action against surveyor. U.C.A.1953, 78-12-26(3).
6. Limitation of Actions <£=>95(3)
"Discovery rule" applied to statute of
limitations governing property vendors1
negligence cause of action against surveyor; action would be completely barred if
rule was not applied, and evidence pertaining to performance of survey was not so
stale as to preclude proper defense.
Ephraim H. Frankhauser, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and appellants.
Rick J. Sutherland, Robert F. Babcock,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees.
HALL, Chief Justice:
This case is on appeal from the Seventh
District Court, Duchesne County. The trial
court found for plaintiffs and rescinded a
land purchase contract based upon mutual
mistake. Defendants were allowed to
bring a third-party complaint against the
surveyor of the property, Glen H. Calder,
John Doe Wilson, and Wilson & Calder
(hereinafter "Calder"), who were eventually granted a summary judgment dismissal
on the basis that the statute of limitation

KLINGER v. RIGHTLY

Utah 869

Cite as 791 ?2d 868 (Utah 1990)

had run for a claim against the surveyor of
the land pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25(2) (1987). We reverse the trial
court's ruling of summary judgment with
regard to the Kightlys' third-party complaint against Calder.
FACTS
In June 1971, defendants purchased a
parcel of unimproved real property located
in Duchesne County, Utah, from Strawberry River Estates (hereinafter "Strawberry") by uniform real estate contract. After
the purchase, defendants hired Wilson &
Calder to survey the property, and on May
15, 1972, defendants received a certificate
of survey signed by Glen H. Calder, certifying the location and dimensions of the property and that there were no encroachments
on it.
Defendants used the property for camping and other recreational purposes between 1971 and 1983. On July 23, 1983,
they sold the property to the Klingers by a
warranty deed containing the description in
the warranty deed from Strawberry to defendants and confirmed in the certificate of
survey obtained from Calder.
In February 1985, the Klingers discovered a discrepancy in the boundaries of the
property. The Klingers brought suit
against defendants for fraud and misrepresentation but later amended their complaint
to a cause of action for mutual mistake.
Defendants were granted leave from the
trial court to file a third-party complaint
against Calder for negligence in conducting
the survey.
The trial court granted a rescission of
the sale contract from defendants to the
Klingers and a summary judgment dismissal to Calder on the basis that the statute
of limitation had run against defendants'
third-party cause of action pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2) (1987). Defendants obtained a settlement with the
Klingers subsequent to trial and before
appeal; therefore, the only issues on appeal are (1) whether the trial court properly
used summary judgment to dismiss the
third-party claim, and (2) whether the trial
court should have applied the discovery
rule to toll the statute of limitation with
regard to defendants' third-party claim
against Calder.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
[1] Defendants' first contention is that
the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to Calder because defendants'
reliance upon the "discovery rule" raised
an issue of fact that could not properly be
disposed of through summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate only
when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.1 The issue is
whether the application of the discovery
rule is a question of law or of fact.
[2,3] The discovery rule determines
when a cause of action accrues in certain
actions. Under the discovery rule, a cause
of action does not accrue and the statute of
limitation does not begin to run until the
plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have learned of
the facts which give rise to the cause of
action.2 The discovery rule functions as an
exception to the normal application of a
statute of limitation.3 Whether the discovery rule applies to a cause of action is,
like the statute of limitation, a question of
law, not of fact.
[41 Questions of law may be disposed of
through summary judgment if there are no
outstanding questions of material fact to

Utah State Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah
Power & Light Co., lib P.2d 632, 634 (Utah
1989); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S & H Ins. Co., 714
P.2d 648, 649 (Utah 1986).

sociates, Inc, 35 Wash.App. 318, 321, 666 P.2d
937, 940 (1983); Metropolitan Services, Inc. v.
Spokane, 32 Wash.App. 714, 720, 649 P.2d 642,
646 (1982).

2. Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 (Utah
1987); Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman As-

3. See generally Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese,
668 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983); Myers v. McDonald,
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981).

1.
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be discerned by the trier of fact.4 Defendants' assertion that questions of fact existed with regard to whether the discovery
rule should be applied to toll the applicable
statute of limitation is erroneous. The trial
court was therefore correct in ruling as a
matter of law on the issue of whether the
discovery rule should be applied to the applicable statute of limitation.
APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATION
[5] Defendants' third-party complaint
states a cause of action for "negligence
and failure of third-party defendants to
properly survey and locate the subject
property for survey." Defendants assert
that their complaint states a cause of action in negligence, and yet they cite Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (1987), which
states, "Within three years: ... (3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or
mistake; except that the cause of action in
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud or mistake."
Section 78-12-26(3) and actions alleging
fraud or mistake are usually based on a
contract, not a negligence, cause of action.
Indeed, Utah case law reveals that this

section has been applied only to the reformation of contracts,5 not to actions in negligence. We hold that section 78-12-26(3) is
inapplicable to defendants' cause of action.
We note that Utah recognizes the theory
of "negligent misrepresentation" with regard to surveyors.6 No matter how the
cause of action is characterized, whether in
tort or contract, it would lapse under any
other Utah statute of limitation without
application of the discovery rule.
DISCOVERY RULE
[6] Defendants' second contention is
that the trial court erred in refusing to
apply the discovery rule to the statute of
limitation applicable to their cause of action
for surveyor negligence.7 Because the issue of whether the discovery rule applies to
toll the statute of limitation is a question of
law, we need show no deference to the trial
court's ruling on appeal, but we review it
for correctness.8
Observing how the discovery rule is applied nationally to the issue of surveyor
negligence or breach of contract does not
indicate any dispositive national trend. A
number of jurisdictions have applied the
discovery rule to surveyor negligence,9

9. See Cristich v. Allen Engineering, Inc., 458
So.2d 76 (Fla.App.1984) (discovery rule implied
where court did not apply the statute of limita5. See Bench v. Pace, 538 P.2d 180 (Utah 1975);
tion for surveyor negligence until the error had
Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 P.
been discovered as directed by the statute); Roz684 (1916).
ny v. Marnul, 43 I11.2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969)
6. Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown (where the facts and statute are essentially on
and Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 59-60 (Utah
point with the present case, the court found that
the discovery rule applied) (as modified on de1986).
nial of rehearing); Raff el v. Perley, 14 Mass.App.
7. The trial court applied Utah Code Ann.
242, 437 N.E.2d 1082 (1982) (trial court's dismis§ 78-12-25(2), which states, "Within four years:
sal reversed on grounds that plaintiff should
... (2) an action for relief not otherwise providhave been able to present evidence that claims
ed for by law." The trial court found that a
for relief did not accrue until plaintiff discovercause of action for surveyor negligence did not
ed error in survey); E.A. Williams, Inc. v. Russo
fall specifically under any existing Utah statute.
Development Corp., 82 N.J. 160, 411 A.2d 697
We note that subsequent to the filing of this
(1980) (where survey was performed in 1954,
action, the Utah legislature amended Utah Code
cause of action did not accrue until plaintiff
Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (Supp.1989) and created subdiscovered error in 1972); New Market Poultry
section (l)(b), which states: 'In an action reFarms, Inc. v. Fellows, 51 NJ. 419, 241 A.2d 633
garding property boundary surveys, the seven(1968) (court held that discovery rule applied
year time period commences when the property
where surveyor conducted an erroneous survey
survey is either recorded in the county recordin 1952 that was not discovered until 1963);
er's office or filed in the county surveyor's office
Hudesman v. Meriwether Leachman Associates,
under Section 17-23-17."
Inc., 35 Wash.App. 318, 666 P.2d 937 (1983)
(confirming discovery rule for surveyor negligence established in Kundahl); Kundahl v. Bar8. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v.
nett, 5 Wash.App. 227, 486 P.2d 1164 (1971)
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989).
4. Utah R-Civ.P. 56(c).
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while others have rejected it.10 Legislative
enactments are even more widespread.11
Some arguments in favor of applying the
discovery rule to cases of surveyor negligence include the following: (1) an innocent
reliant party should not carry the burden
of a surveyor's professional mistakes;12 (2)
"recovery . . . by a reliant user whose ultimate use was foreseeable will promote cautionary techiques [sic] among surveyors";13 (3) "[t]he passage of time does not
entail the danger of a fraudulent, false,
frivolous,
speculative
or
uncertain
claim
Further, under the said facts it
does not appear possible that by reason of
the passage of time [the] defendant's testimonial proof of a defense would be made
more difficult"; u (4) it is illogical to refaction against land surveyor for negligence in
making survey did not accrue until injured party discovered or had reasonable grounds to discover error in survey).
10. See Lembert v. Gilmore, 312 A.2d 335 (Del.Super.1973) (court viewed cause of action as one
in contract and held that cause accrued when
contract was breached, i.e., when the stakes
were erroneously placed by the surveyor); Howell v. Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962)
(where survey was performed in 1934 and error
was discovered in 1958, court found time too
remote to hold a surveyor liable).
11. See Ark.Stat.Ann. § 16-56-112 (1987) (fiveyear statute of limitation from substantial completion of the project); Cal.Civ.P.Code §§ 337.1(a), 337.15(a) (West 1982) (section 337.1(a)—
four-year patent survey defect; section 337.15(a)
—ten-year latent survey defect); Colo.Rev.Stat.
§ 13-80-105 (1987) (within three years after discovery, ten-year statute of repose); Del.Code
Ann. tit. 10 § 8122 (1974) (to mark and bound
lands, seven years from the date of return of
commissions); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 110, fl13-222
(1984) (four years from the date plaintiff knew
or should have known of the erroneous survey);
Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 5-112 (1989)
(three years after discovery or twenty-year statute of repose, whichever occurs first); Mich.
Comp.Laws § 600.5838 (1987) (accrues when
professional relationship ends or must be
brought within six months of discovery); Minn.
Stat. § 541.052 (1988) (two years after discovery
or ten-year statute of repose, whichever occurs
first); Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.098 (1986) (five years
after date of discovery of surveyor negligence);
Mont.Code Ann. § 27-2-208 (1988) (ten years
after completion of the project but may be applicable only to projects for construction or
improvements); Or.Rev.Stat. § 12.135 (1987)
(ten years after completion but may be applica-

quire the plaintiff to hire two or three
surveyors to assure that the first survey is
correct;,5 (5) strict application of the statute of limitation would be unjust;,6 and (6)
the plaintiff lacks the means or ability to
ascertain that a wrong has been committed.17
Arguments in opposition to application of
the discovery rule in surveyor negligence
cases include (1) "the onerousness of potential liability continuing throughout one's
professional life, the prejudice wrought by
the passage of time not only in terms of
defending against claims but also in factually ascertaining the true cause or causes
of injuries";18 and (2) "mere ignorance of
the existence of a cause of action does not
prevent the running of the statute of limible to projects for construction or improvements only); Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 42, § 5537 (Purdon 1981 & Supp.1989) (four years from date of
discovery but in no event later than twenty-one
years); Tenn.Code Ann. § 28-3-114 (1980) (four
years from the date survey is recorded on plat);
Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.011 (Vernon Supp.1990) (ten years after the date survey
is complete); Wash.Rev.Code § 4.16.310 (1989)
(six years after completion but may be limited
to improvements and construction); W.Va.Code
§ 55-2-6a (1981 & Supp.1989) (ten years after
owner accepts or occupies, but may be limited
to improvements and construction only); Wis.
Stat. § 893.37 (1987-1988) (six years after completion of the survey).
12. Rozny, 250 N.E.2d at 663.
13. Id
14. New Market Poultry Farms, 241 A.2d at 636.
15. Kundahl, 486 P.2d at 1167.
16. Id; see abo EA. Williams, Inc., 411 A.2d at
700; Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah
1981).
17. Hudesman, 666 P.2d at 940 (citing U.S. Oil &
Refining Co. v. Department of Ecology, 96
Wash.2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 1329, 1334 (1981)); see
also Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.
18. EA. Williams, Inc., 411 A.2d at 701; see also
Howell, 362 S.W.2d at 926 (citing Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931)); Becton Dickinson & Co. v. Reese, 668
P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983) (quoting Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct. 582, 586,
88 L.Ed. 788 (1944)); Myers, 635 P.2d at 87.
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tations." ,9
Because compelling arguments exist on
both sides regarding the applicability or
inapplicability of the discovery rule, we
must seek a way to balance the interests of
each party. In Myers, we listed three circumstances under which the discovery rule
should be applied and we adopted a balancing test for application of the rule. The
three circumstances set out in Myers
whereby this Court will apply the discovery
rule are where (1) the legislature has
adopted the discovery rule by statute; (2)
there is proof of concealment or misleading
by the defendant; and (3) application of the
general statute of limitation rule would be
irrational or unjust.20 Defendants do not
assert either of the first two parts of the
test, but they do seek an equitable ruling
as to whether the application of the discovery rule would prevent an irrational or
unjust result.
In Myers, we applied the balancing test
to evaluate whether the application of the
discovery rule would be irrational or unjust The plaintiffs in Myers were guardians of a minor who was killed in an automobile accident. However, they were unable to discover that the victim was their
ward until after the statute of limitation
for wrongful death had run. We held that
the discovery rule should be applied where
"[t]he hardship the statute of limitations
would impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances of [the] case outweighed any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of
proof caused by the passage of time/' 2 1
This balancing test is a question of law.22
Applying the balancing test to the
present case, we find the obvious prejudice
to defendants is that without application of
the discovery rule, their cause of action is
completely barred regardless of whether
their complaint is in contract or in tort.
This is so despite the fact that there are no
equities that weigh against them. They
had no reason to suspect that the survey
was inaccurate, nor did they refrain from

doing anything that might reasonably have
been expected of them that could have disclosed the error. On the other hand, the
prejudice to defendants is that the record
reflects that no survey records or notes are
available after fourteen years and, presumably, the memories of the members of the
survey party have dimmed. The only existing record of the survey is the survey
certificate signed by third-party defendant
Glen H. Calder that specifies the boundaries of the property. While the record
reflects that Calder himself may not have
been a member of the survey party, as
signor on the survey certificate he is responsible for its content, is still actively
engaged in the practice of surveying, and is
available for testimony.
Utilizing the balancing test and being
conscious of the purposes of statutes of
limitation, we hold that under the facts of
this case the evidence is not so stale or
remote as to outweigh the prejudice to
defendants of having their claim barred by
the statute of limitation. The discovery
rule should be applied to the statute of
limitation for surveyor negligence under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(2).
The ruling of the trial court in favor of
summary judgment for third-party defendants is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with our
decision.
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
(concurring)
I concur but write to observe that the
application of the discovery rule here is
consistent with the application of the discovery rule in a case of alleged medical
malpractice, Christiansen v. Rees. 20 Utah
2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968) (broken surgical
needle left in body). Since that decision,
the legislature has enacted Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4, shortening the period in which a

19. Myers, 635 P.2d at 86 (citing Baker v. Beech 21. Id at 87.
Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d 315, 114 Cal.Rptr.
171 (1974)).
22. Id.
20. Id at 86.
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malpractice action may be brought against
a health care provider to two years (subject
to exceptions) after the patient discovers,
or should discover, his injury, but not to
exceed four years after the date of the
alleged act, omission, neglect, or occurrence. No similar enactment has been
made by the legislature with regard to
alleged surveyor malpractice such as we
are confronted with in the instant case.
Thus the discovery rule adopted in Christiansen v. Rees would seem to be applicable here. Our action is also consistent with
the application of the discovery rule in a
legal malpractice action decided recently by
our Court of Appeals, Merkley v. Beaslin,
778 P.2d 16 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
STEWART, J., concurs in the result.
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Robert DUNN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Gerald L. COOK, Warden, Utah State
Prison, State of Utah, Defendant
and Appellee.
No. 880067.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 2, 1990.

Defendant appealed after he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and second-degree murder. The Supreme Court,
646 P.2d 709, granted defense counsel's
request to withdraw. Defendant sought
writ of habeas corpus. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Michael R. Murphy, J., dismissed petition without hearing,
and defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) defense
counsel's Anders brief was inadequate as
matter of law and showed that defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel

on appeal, and (2) prior appeal was not a
bar to habeas proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Zimmerman, J., concurred in result and
filed opinion in which Hall, CJ., joined.
Howe, Associate CJ., concurred in result.
1. Double Jeopardy 3=*112
Defendant who was convicted of second-degree murder and aggravated kidnapping and sentenced to life imprisonment
could not have been sentenced to death at
retrial. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-405.
2. Judgment <s=*751
Doctrines of waiver and res judicata do
not stand as unyielding bar to litigation of
claims that either once were or could have
been litigated in prior proceeding if relitigation is necessary to vindicate constitutional right to fair trial, despite defaults of
defendant's attorney.
U.S.C.A. Const
Amend. 6.
3. Habeas Corpus ^=287
Existence of prior appellate proceedings does not ipso facto bar subsequent
habeas corpus proceedings.
4. Habeas Corpus <§=>447
To be entitled to writ of habeas corpus
petitioner must show obvious injustice or
substantial and prejudicial denial of constitutional right.
5. Criminal Law <®=>1077.3
Defendant's direct appeal presented by
counsel in form of Anders brief did not
meet standards necessary to provide effective assistance of counsel on appeal; brief
merely recited prosecution and defense evidence and stated each of four issues as
single short sentence, brief presented no
argument, brief listed cases but did not
state case facts, and only two of four stated issues contained citations to any part of
record. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6.
6. Criminal Law <s=>1077.3
In order to present sufficient Anders
brief, arguments must be sufficiently articulated to justify conclusion that counsel
has truly sought to present meritorious
issues but cannot; it is not enough to list
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disturbed when they are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Fisher v. Taylor, Utah, 572 P.2d 393 (1977);
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Guthrie, 123 Utah
172, 256 P.2d 706 (1953).
[2] The record discloses substantial evidence in support of the findings and judgment of the district court. The bulk of the
evidence at trial came from the testimony
of the officers of Car Doctor and from
Belmont and Olinyk. The testimony was in
sharp conflict; however, as to the five conditions listed in the March 4, 1977, agreement, the record supports the finding that
none was completed. Since the agreement
stated that the partnership agreement
"shall not become effective until the following conditions have been met," the trial
court properly concluded that no partnership came into existence.
[3] As to the estoppel issue, defendants
argue that pursuant to § 4S-1-13, Utah
Code Ann. (1953), as amended, a partnership by estoppel was established.1 We need
not decide whether the doctrine of partnership by estoppel can ever be applied between putative partners, since there is
nothing in the record to indicate, nor did
the lower court find, that plaintiffs actions
in this case were either inconsistent with or
sufficient to nullify the outstanding conditions of the written agreement. Rather,
the conduct of plaintiff through its officers
at all times remained subject to the agreement which specified when the partnership
would come into existence.
It follows that judgment was properly
rendered in favor of the plaintiff on its
claim, and against defendants on their
counterclaim.
The judgment is affirmed. Costs to Respondent
HALL, C. J., and HOWE and OAKS, JJ.,
concur.

Robert MYERS and Jackie Myers, his
wife, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Reggie McDONALD, Defendant
and Respondent
No. 17046.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 11, 1981.

Guardian of 14-year-old ward killed in
automobile accident appealed from order of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Bryant H. Croft, J., dismissing their wrongful death action as barred by statute of
limitations./The Supreme Court, Oaks, J.,
held that policy against stale claims was
outweighed by unique circumstances of
guardians' hardship; therefore, it was improper for trial court to dismiss guardians'
action on pleadings on basis of statute of
limitations.
Reversed and remanded.
Howe, J., filed concurring opinion.
1. Limitation of Actions <*=»!
Statutes of limitations are designed to
promote justice by preventing surprise
through revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses
have disappeared.
2. Limitation of Actions $=»95(1)
Mere ignorance of existence of cause of
action does not prevent running of statute
of limitations.

MAUGHAN, J., heard the arguments but
died before the opinion was filed.

3. Death <s=>39
Limitation of Actions <s=>95(l)
Where guardians had no knowledge of
their ward's death in automobile accident

1. That section provides in pertinent part:
When a person by words spoken or written
or by conduct represents himself, or consents
to another's representing him, to anyone as a
'partner, in an existing partnership or with

one or more persons not actual partners, he
is liable to any such person to whom such
representation has been made who has on
the faith of such representation given credit
to the actual or apparent partnership. .. .
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and therefore no knowledge that cause of
action existed until after two-year limitation period had expired, and guardians
could not file action for damages or even
initiate investigative efforts to determine
cause of death of which they had no
knowledge, policy against stale claims was
outweighed by unique circumstances of
guardians' hardship; therefore, trial court
improperly dismissed guardians' action on
pleadings on basis of statute of limitations.
U.CA.1953, 78-12-28.

Anthony M. Thurber, Salt Lake City, for
plaintiffs and appellants.
Nelson L. Hayes, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
OAKS, Justice:
The issue on this appeal is the application
of our two-year statute of limitations for a
wrongful death action, U.C.A., 1953, § 7812-28, to a case where the plaintiffs were
unaware of the fact and circumstances of
their decedent's death until after the statutory period. The district court dismissed
the complaint as barred by the statute of
limitations. We reverse.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, the facts are as follows.1 Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were guardians of
14-year-old Bobbie Menzies, the wife's
brother. When Bobbie failed to return
home after leaving with some friends,
plaintiffs reported his disappearance to the
police. Because he was a minor, the police
department listed him as a runaway rather
than as a missing person, which would have
resulted in an automatic check of the local
morgue.
1. In determining the correctness of a judgment
of dismissal, we view the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Davis v. Payne and
Day, Inc., 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (1960);
Williams v. Z.C.M.I.. 6 Utah 2d 283. 312 P.2d
564 (1957). Under that rule, we need not resolve the puzzling inconsistencies in this record. Thus, plaintiffs' affidavit shows the date

During the year following Bobbie's disappearance, plaintiffs made "at least several
dozen" contacts with the police in futile
attempts to determine Bobbie's whereabouts. Plaintiffs also read newspaper articles concerning a Nov. 22, 1976, automobile accident in Salt Lake County in which a
car went out of control and collided with a
large tree. That accident resulted in the
death of a mysterious passenger, who was
identified by the driver of the vehicle only
as "Joey." Because that victim was described as being 5 feet 8 inches tall, brown
haired, and in his "early twenties," whereas
Bobbie was 6 feet 2 inches tall, blonde, and
14 years of age, plaintiffs did not identify
Bobbie as the victim at that time.
In July, 1979, a police detective contacted
plaintiffs as part of a routine follow-up. In
response to plaintiffs' queries, he told them
that the mysterious accident victim had not
yet been identified. Plaintiffs subsequently
went to the morgue and identified the accident victim as their ward, Bobbie. On October 29, 1979, almost three years after the
fatal accident, but only three months after
their identification of the body of their
ward, plaintiffs brought this wrongful
death action against defendant, driver of
the accident vehicle, alleging intoxication
and/or willful misconduct.
Though this action was admittedly
brought over two years after Bobbie Menzies' death, plaintiffs argue that it should
not be barred by the statute of limitations,
since they had no knowledge of the death of
their ward within that period. They argue
(1) that the causes of action should not accrue until plaintiffs discovered the death—
the so-called "discovery rule"—or (2) that
defendant should be precluded from relying
on the statute because his erroneous reporting of the decedent's name as "Joey" misled
plaintiffs and prevented them from instiof their ward's disappearance as Dec 22, 1977,
which is over a year after the date of death
alleged in the complaint. Whether this inconsistency and others appearing in the record are
evidence of factual inconsistencies or merely
typographical errors is a matter that wiU be
determined on remand.
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tuting their action in timely fashion.2 We
reverse on the first ground; the second
ground may be an issue on remand.
[1,2] The governing policy in this area,
as declared by the United States Supreme
Court, is that statutes of limitations "are
designed to promote justice by preventing
surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded; and
witnesses have disappeared." Order of
Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct.
582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 788 (1944). In furtherance of that policy, the general rule is that
a cause of action accrues upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete
the cause of action.3 Under that rule, mere
ignorance of the existence of a cause of
action does not prevent the running of the
statute of limitations.4
There are a number of exceptions to this
general rule. In some enumerated areas of
2. This case does not involve the kind of disability where the legislature has provided for a
tolling of the statute of limitations. U.C.A.,
1953, §§ 78-12-21, 78-12-36 (minority, insanity, imprisonment); § 78-12-35 (absence from
state); § 78-12-39 (war). Some of these statutes have been applied to wrongful death actions. Switzer v. Reynolds, Utah, 606 P.2d 244
(1980); Seeley v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 252, 365
P.2d 63 (1961); Platz v. International Smelting
Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 P. 187 (1922).

the law, our Legislature has adopted the
discovery rule by statute so that the limitations period does not begin to run until the
discovery of facts forming the basis for the
cause of action.5 In other circumstances,
where the statute of limitations would normally apply, this Court has held that proof
of concealment or misleading by the defendant precludes the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations.6 This is
plaintiffs' second theory in this case. Finally, without regard to proof of wrongdoing
on the part of the defendant, the courts of
some states have adopted the discovery rule
by judicial action as to exceptional circumstances or causes of action where the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust.7 Those precedents point the
way toward what we deem to be the appropriate decision in this case.
[3] Here, it is alleged that despite their
efforts to discover his whereabouts plaintiffs had no knowledge of their ward's
Rouse, 48 Wis.2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970)
(legal malpractice).
4. Baker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 39 Cal.App.3d
315, 114 Cal.Rptr. 171 (1974) (wrongful death);
Peteler v. Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P.2d 244
(1932) (medical malpractice prior to passage of
§ 78-14-4).

5. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-12-19 (recovery of any
estate sold by an executor or administrator);
§ 78-12-26(1) (waste or trespass by under3. Getz v. Bruch, 400 F.Supp. 1033 (E.D.Pa.
ground works on a mining claim); § 78-121975) (illegal arrest); Knudson v. Weeks, 394
26(2) (loss of branded livestock); § 78-12F.Supp. 963 (W.D.Okl.1975) (surveyor's and
home builder's negligence); Brown v. Chicago,
26(3) (fraud); § 78-12-27 (actions against corRock Island & Pacific R.R., 212 F.Supp. 832
porate stockholders or directors); § 78-14-4
(W.D.Mo.1963) (libel); Jackson v. American
(health care malpractice), interpreted in Foil v.
Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 199, 531 P.2d Bailinger, Utah, 601 P.2d 144 (1979).
932 (1975) (conversion); Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 6. E.g., Vincent v. Salt Lake County, Utah, 583
Inc., 16 IU.App.3d 709, 306 N.E2d 549 (1973)
P.2d 105 (1978); Rice v. Granite School Dis(libel); Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307
trict, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969).
Minn. 344, 240 N.W.2d 507 (1976) (inadequate
consideration for stock transfer); Bowling v.
S.S. Kresge Co., Mo., 431 S.W.2d 191 (1968) 7. Hart v. Hart, Fla.App.. 234 So.2d 393 (1970)
(conversion); Mumford v. Staton, Whaley &
(unauthorized stock transfer); Davis v. State,
Price, 254 Md. 697, 255 A.2d 359 (1969) (legal
84 Misc.2d 597, 377 N.Y.S.2d 385 (N.Y.Ct.Cl.
malpractice); Thompson v. Equitable Life As1975), rev'd on other grounds, 54 A.D.2d 126,
surance Soc. of U.S., 447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422
388 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1976) (damages for wrongful
(1972) (recovery on insurance policy); Medrelease of confidential information); Sosnow v.
Mar, Inc. v. Dilworth, 214 Pa.Super. 402, 257
Paul, 43 A.D.2d 978, 352 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1974),
A.2d 910 (1969) (architect's malpractice); Famaffd 36 N.Y.2d 780, 369 N.Y.S.2d 693, 330
ily Savings and Loan, Inc. v. Cicarello, 157
N.E.2d 643 (1975) (architect's malpractice);
W.Va. 983, 207 S.E.2d 157 (1974) (legal malShipp v. O'Dowd, 454 S.W.2d 845 (Tex.Civ.
practice). Compare cases cited in note 3.
App.l970) (breach of contract); Denzer v.
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death and therefore no knowledge that a
cause of action existed until after the twoyear limitations period had expired. The
closest precedent for that circumstance is
apparently Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., 42
Ill.App.3d 330, 365 N.EJ2d 686 (1976). In
that case, plaintiffs decedents did not return from a long flight in a small private
airplane. The wreckage of the plane, in
which all occupants perished, was not discovered until about two years and eight
months after their disappearance. The applicable limitation would have barred any
action if the statutory period commenced at
the time of death. However, the Illinois
court held that the action was timely because the cause of action did not accrue
until the wreckage was discovered and the
plaintiff received knowledge of the deaths.
This application of the discovery rule was
apparently based on a balancing test The
hardship the statute of limitations would
impose on the plaintiff in the circumstances
of that case outweighed any prejudice to
the defendant from difficulties of proof
caused by the passage of time.
In this case, the policy against stale
claims is also outweighed by the unique
circumstances of plaintiffs' hardship. Defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by having to defend a stale claim
since his problems of proof occasioned by
the delay are no greater than the plaintiffs'.
In contrast, plaintiffs could not file an action for damages or even initiate investigative efforts to determine the cause of a
death of which they had no knowledge.8
Plaintiffs therefore had no alternative other than to bring their action after the statutory limitation period had expired. If
plaintiffs are denied the opportunity of proceeding with that action, the law would be
in the untenable position of having created
a remedy for plaintiffs and then barring
them from exercising it before they had
any practical opportunity to do so.
According to the facts alleged by the
plaintiffs, this is an appropriate circumstance to apply the exceptional "discovery
8. This is not a case where the fact of death was
known but the cause of the fatal accident was

rule." Praznik v. Sport Aero, Inc., supra.
If plaintiffs are unable to prove their allegations of due diligence at trial, this action
would still be barred by the statute of limitations unless plaintiffs can prevail by proof
of their alternate theory of concealment or
misleading by defendant. All we hold here
is that it was improper for the trial court to
dismiss plaintiffs' action on the pleadings
on the basis of the statute of limitations.
The judgment of the district court is
therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion. Costs to appellant
STEWART, J., and THORNLEY K.
SWAN, District Judge, concur.
HOWE, Justice (concurring):
I concur. We have two alternatives in
dealing with the problem here presented.
The first alternative is to closely adhere to
the statute which in its wording makes no
allowance for the unusual circumstance of
the death not being discovered until after
the period of limitations had run. The
second alternative is to carve out an exception to the statutory language and allow
the plaintiffs to pursue their claim, where
through no fault of their own the fact of
death could not have been discovered earlier.
This Court in Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27
Utah 2d 27, 492 ?J2d 1335 (1972), was faced
with a somewhat similar problem where a
two-year old child was injured due to an
alleged defect of a city street Section 107-77, U.C.A. 1953, provided that a claim
against a city for injury caused by a defective street must be presented within 30
days. The parents of the child did not
present the claim to the city until seven
months later. We upheld the dismissal of
the lawsuit because the claim had not been
timely filed. We followed an earlier decision of this Court, Hurley v. Bingham, 63
Utah 589, 228 P. 213 (1924), and refused to
make an exception to the statute even
though the child was under legal disability.
not. E.g., Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., Fla.
App.f 320 So.2d 418 (1975).
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We announced that if there was any change
to be made to the statute it should be done
by a clear expression of the Legislature.
We followed that rule in Varoz v. Sevey, 29
Utah 2d 158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), involving
a minor's claim under our tort claims act,
§ 63-30-13, U.C.A. 1953.
There is merit to the position of refusing
to make an exception to the plain wording
of a statute which makes no allowance for
the legal disability of a child, or in this case,
for learning of the death after the statute
of limitations had run. We should be careful not to encroach upon legislative prerogative. However, there may well be a denial
of constitutional rights in foreclosing persons from access to the court under these
unusual circumstances. Besides the constitutional guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the law, our Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11, provides that
"All courts shall be open, and every person,
for an injury done to him in his person . . .
shall have remedy by due course of law,
which shall be administered without denial...."
Because of these constitutional protections, I think this Court is required to take
the position followed by the majority opinion and judicially create an exception to the
statute which has failed to recognize this
unique fact situation. To refer the problem
to the Legislature as we did in Gallegos v.
Midvale City, supra, would be to deny these
plaintiffs their constitutional rights. We
recognized that denial in Scott v. School
Board, Utah, 568 P.2d 746 (1977), and impliedly overruled Gallegos v. Midvale City,
supra, and Varoz v. Sevey, supra.
HALL, C. J., having disqualified himself,
does not participate herein; SWAN, District Judge, sat.
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Cleo MORRIUU Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
J & M CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC. and Faireld J. Christensen,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 17049.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 11, 1981.
Mother brought wrongful death action
against her son's employer, after her son
was killed during course of his employment
in a cave-in incident. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Bryant H. Croft,
J., dismissed action, and mother appealed.
The Supreme Court held that Workmen's
Compensation Act was exclusive vehicle for
recovery of compensation for injury or
death against employer of decedent, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff was not a
"dependent" under the Compensation Act
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in result
Workers' Compensation $=»2145
Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive vehicle for recovery of compensation
for injury or death against employer of
decedent, notwithstanding fact that plaintiff was not a "dependent," and thus could
not recover, under the Compensation Act.
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-1 et seq., 35-1-60, 78-117; Const Art. 16, § 5.
Gary A. Frank, Murray, for plaintiff and
appellant.
David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment dismissing an action brought by appellant under Title 78-11-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, known as the Wrongful
Death Act, against her son's employer, after her son was killed during the course of
his employment in a cave-in incident
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Institution of proceedings.
The state has not waived its governmental
immunity for negligence arising out of the
institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or
without probable cause. Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998).

Police actions.
Plaintiff's state law claims against police
officers for assault, unlawful detention, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress were
barred by the state governmental immunity
act. Oliver v. Woods, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1325 (D.
Utah 1998).

Natural conditions.
College officials were immune from claims
filed by the parents of a student who died in a
fall from a cliff, because the cause of death was
the naturally occurring cliffs, not the act of
planning a party in the vicinity of the cliffs.
Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D.
Utah 1999).

Schools.
Like local school districts, the state school for
t h e d e a f a n d b l i n d s h a r e s i n s t a t e sovereign
i m m u n i t y . Sutton v. Utah State School for the
Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999).
Cited in Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n,
945 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Case Law
Developments: Restoration of Governmental
Immunity: The Assault Exception to Immunity

Waivers After Taylor v. Ogden School District,
1997 Utah L. Rev. 1138.

63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Contents — Service
— Legal disability [Effective until July 1, 2001].
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining
an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board,
when the claim is against a school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is
against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of
Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public
board, commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant
may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
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(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the dela}' in serving the notice of claim will substantially
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.

Claim for injury — Notice — Contents —
Service — Legal disability — Appointment of
guardian ad litem [Effective July 1, 2001].
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the
claim were against a private person begins to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or
against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance
of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of
authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining
an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is
characterized as governmental.
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known,
(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent,
attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered to:
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an
incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board,
when the claim is against a school district or board of education;
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is
against a special district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of
Utah; or
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or
executive secretary, when the claim is against any other public
board, commission, or body.
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant
may apply to the court to extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court
may extend the time for service of notice of claim.
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall
consider whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially
prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the
merits.
(d) (i) If am injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim
against a governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant
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described in Subsection (4)(a), that government entity may file a
request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
the potential claimant.
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this Subsection (4)(d),
the time for filing a claim under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13
begins when the order appointing the guardian is issued.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch.
27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch. 75, § 4;
1991, ch. 76, § 6; 1998, ch. 164, § 1; 2000, ch.
157, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted uthe
employee's" for "his" in Subsection (2); deleted

"the responsible governmental entity according
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or
63-30-13" from Subsection (3XbMii); added Subsections (3XbXiiXA) to (3)(bXiiXF); and made
stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 2000 amendment, effective July 1. 2001,
added Subsection (4)(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Notice.
Sufficiency of notice.
—Nature of claim asserted.
—Statement of facts.
Notice.
The filing of a notice of claim upon the
governing body of a third class city, pursuant to
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, is satisfied by filing the notice of claim with the city
recorder. Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955
P.2d 343 (Utah 1998).
Letters hand-delivered to the county Board of
Commissioners, which set forth the facts surrounding a boundary dispute, but were not
worded so as to alert the Board or the county to
any impending legal action and made no mention of the plaintiff's intention to seek any
judicial remedy, were not sufficient notice of a
claim and the actual notice did not cure the
failure to comply strictly with the requirements
of this chapter. Rushton v. Salt Lake County,
1999 UT 36, 977 P.2d 1201.
Because the plaintiffs did not give written
notice of claim to the defendant school district
and its employees, their claim failed for failure
to meet the requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Jensen v. Reeves, 45 F.
Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Utah 1999).

Because a judge was an officer of a state
governmental entity, notice of claim requirements applied with respect to all acts or omissions occurring in the course of her employment
or under color of authority, whether part of her
judicial acts or of her administrative responsibilities. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d
36.
Sufficiency of notice.
—Nature of claim asserted.
Letter sent by plaintiffs counsel to defendant
that did not state a claim or any intention to
make one, nor state the amount of damages
incurred or provide any other information
about the extent or nature of damages did not
comply with the requirement that a notice of
claim set forth the nature of the claim and the
damages. Johnson v. City of Bountiful, 996 F.
Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998).
—Statement of facts.
Letter sent by plaintiffs counsel that included the police report of the accident on
which the lawsuit was based and that informed
the defendant that plaintiff was injured was
sufficient to comply with the requirement that
a notice of claim set forth a brief statement of
the facts. Johnson v. City of Bountiful. 996 F.
Supp. 1100 (D. Utah 1998).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Complaint as satisfying requirement of notice of claim upon states, municipalities, and other political subdivisions, 45
A.L.R.5th 109.
Persons or entities upon whom notice of injury or claim against state or state agencies
may or must be served, 45 A.L.R.5th 173.
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local
government unit as regards identity, name,

address, and residence of claimant, 53
A.L.R.5th 617.
Sufficiency of notice of claim against local
political entity as regards time when accident
occurred, 57 A.L.R.5th 689.
Waiver of, or estoppel to assert, failure to give
or defects in notice of claim against state or
local political subdivision — modern status, 64
A.L.R.5th 519.
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63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee — Time for
filing notice.
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission
occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed
with the attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless
of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as
governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 12; 1978, ch.
27, § 6; 1983, ch. 131, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 5;
1998, ch. 164, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-

ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the
employee's" for "his" near the beginning and
deleted "and the agency concerned" after "attorney general."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Compliance with section.
Recovery of real property.
Cited.
Compliance with section.
Where a plaintiff did not file a notice of claim
against the state and its employees until more
than two years after the incident at issue, his
claim was barred. Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp.
2d 1315 (D. Utah 1998).
Although plaintiffs amended complaint was
minimally sufficient to state a claim for wrongful refusal to allow writ of habeas corpus, the
claim was barred for failure to comply with the
requirements of the immunity statute because
it was not filed until almost two years after the
denial of plaintiffs petition for a writ of habeas

corpus and it was never filed with the Attorney
General. Straley v. Halliday, 997 P.2d 338 (Utah
Ct. App. 2000).
Recovery of real property.
The one year statute of limitations under this
section applied to a claim against the Department of Transportation arising from the sale of
property to the Department, which the plaintiff
claimed was invalid as not properly executed,
because the action was not a claim on a contractual obligation under § 63-30-5, which
would be exempt from this section, but was
rather a claim to recover property under § 6330-6. Bullock v. State, DOT, 966 P.2d 1215
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Cited in Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955
P.2d 343 (Utah 1998).

63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee — Time for filing notice.
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of
claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision according to
the requirements of Section 63-30-11 within one year after the claim arises, or
before the expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11,
regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch.
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3; 1987, ch. 75, § 6;
1998, ch. 164, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amend-

ment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the
employee's" for "his" near the beginning and
inserted "according to the requirements of Section 63-30-11* after "political subdivision."
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955
P.2d 343 (Utah 1998).

63-30-14. Claim for injury — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within
ninety days.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Noncompliance.
was properly dismissed as being untimely.
Action for conveyance of excess acreage filed Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, 977
one and a half years after filing a notice of claim P.2d 1201.

63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time
for filing action against governmental entity.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Dismissal proper,
was properly dismissed as being untimely.
Action for conveyance of excess acreage filed Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, 977
one and a half years after filing a notice of claim P.2d 1201.

63-30-16. Jurisdiction of district courts over actions —
Application of Rules of Civil Procedure.
(1) The district courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over any
action brought under this chapter.
(2) An action brought under this chapter may not be tried as a small claims
action and shall be governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to the extent
they are consistent with this chapter.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 16; 1983, ch.
129, § 7; 1999, ch. 166, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment, effective May 3, 1999, divided the provi-

sion, adding the Subsection (1) and (2) designations; added "may not be tried as a small claims
action and" in Subsection (2); and made stylistic changes.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Sovereign immunity in federal courts.
The state governmental immunity statute
goes beyond mere consent to be sued in the
state's own courts; its express declaration that
those courts are the exclusive tribunals for

suits against the state amounts to a positive
expression of policy against suits against Utah
in federal courts. Sutton v. Utah State School
for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir.
1999).

63-30-19. Undertaking required of plaintiff in action.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Time for
filing.
Where the plaintiff failed to file a defamation
claim within one year of the accrual of the
action, and also failed to file an undertaking as
required by § 63-30-19, he could not avoid

dismissal of his suit by recharacterizing his
claim as a fourteenth amendment violation,
Hummel v. McCotter, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1322 (D.
Utah 1998).

DAVID E. YOCOM (3581)
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
c
KEVAN F. SMITH (3005)
Deputy District Attorney
Attorneys for Appellees Salt Lake County and Katie Dixon
2001 South State St., # S-3600
Salt Lake City, UT 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-3420

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC.
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM S. LOVE, et al.,
Defendants and Appellees

WILLIAM S. LOVE & IRENE C. LOVE,
Counterclaimants and ThirdParty Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Case No. 20010266 - SC

Priority No. 15

vs.
ARNOLD INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,
Counterclaim and Third-Party
Defendants.

I certify that on the ±L^f^day

of September, 2001, two true

and correct copies of the Brief of Appellees Salt Lake County and
Katie L. Dixon, with Addendum, were sent via the United States

Mail Service, first class postage prepaid, addressed to each of
the following:
Sherman C. Young
Ivie & Young
226 West 2230 North
P.O. Box 657
Provo, UT 84603
Ronald G. Russell
Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, UT 8414?
L. Benson Mabey
Mabey & Coombs, L.C.
Highland Park Plaza
3098 South Highland Dr., Suite 323
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Blake T. Heiner
330 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

tc
DATED this /Z

day of September, 2001

>^__^_^3 (^j-*** zz£-

